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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Gregory Oar, 
Plaintiff & Appellant, 
vs, 
Dale Parks and Sterling Press, 
Inc. 
Defendants & Appellees. 
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLANT COURT 
This case originated in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah as civil case number 90-0904365PR. 
It was originally assigned to the Honorable James S. Sawaya 
and subsequently, upon Judge Sawaya1s retirement, to the 
Honorable Tyrone Medley. 
JURISDICTION: The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Constitition, Article VIII, Section 3(a), 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-2-2(3) (j) (1978), and Utah Rules of Ap-
peals, 3(a) and 4(a) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
On October 7, 1993 it was submitted to the Superior Court 
clerk and was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals 
ii 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Honorable James S. Sawaya, judge of the Third District 
court, it is asserted made an error in this case. The error 
alleged is stated below: 
In a hearing on May 11, 1992 Judge Sawaya ruled that 
attorney Allen Sims should be allowed to continue as attorney for 
the defendant even though he had represented the plaintiff in 
several matters just a few years earlier. These legal matters 
included preparation of many of the very documents which were 
presented in this case thereby constituting an extremely flagrant 
conflict of interest. 
At the same hearing a motion was heard wherein Plaintiff 
asked for an accounting of the rental income and expenses from 
the property and a check for his share of the net rental income. 
Allen Sims stated that there had been no accounting made and 
there were no funds to disburse. Allen Sims knew full well that 
there was a joint checking account from which the expenses of 
owning the property were paid since he himself, for some reason 
unknown to the Plaintiff, was issued a check from the account. 
In other words Allen Sims lied to Judge Sawaya causing Plaintiff 
to lose the property. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is on appeal from the Third District Court's 
ruling, made at a hearing on May 11, 1992, that Allen Sims was to 
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remain the attorney of record in this case even though the weight 
of evidence indicated that Sims represented Plaintiff/Appellant 
Gregory H. Oar on numerous occasions and was not eligible to 
represent Parks in this case. 
Allen Sims was a member of the firm of Biele, Haslam & Hatch 
when Gregory Oar, as president of Sterling Press Inc., engaged 
them to do corporate matters along with some personal litigation 
for himself. 
Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct sets 
forth the circumstances under which a lawyer may not represent a 
party whose claims are adverse to those of a former client. That 
provision is as follows: 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a 
matter shall not thereafter; a) represent another 
person in the same or a substantially factually related 
matter in which that person's interest are materially 
adverse to the interest of the former client unless the 
former client consents after consultation; or b) use 
information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 
would permit with respect to a client or when the 
information has become generally know. 
There is ample evidence that attorney Allen Sims is well 
aware that he was not and is not eligible to represent Dale S. 
Parks in any action involving Gregory Oar. When Plaintiff 
/Appellant Gregory H. Oar filed suit in Oar vs. Parks involving a 
matter where Parks defrauded Oar, Allen Sims apparently advised 
Parks to seek other counsel. Parks then hired Michael N. Zundel 
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of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn to handle that litigation. 
In yet another case, which just recently came to light, and 
which is still before the court, Oar vs. Parks and deMik, Parks 
hired yet another attorney to defend him, L. Benson Mabey. If 
Sims really thought that he was eligible to represent Parks he 
certainly would have taken care of these matters in addition to 
this current matter before the court. 
It has become standard practice for law firms to check all 
new client's names against a list, which is usually computerized, 
of their clients so that they are alerted when a possible 
conflict arises. This shows the importance that attorneys 
generally assign to adhering to Rule 1.9. Sims adhered to none 
of this. Sims arrogantly states, in his reply to the motion to 
disqualify, that he represented the corporation, Sterling Press 
Inc., but neither one of the principals, as if the corporation 
was someone else. 
In yet another case (Oar vs. Parks), which has not yet been 
filed, involving Parks defrauding Oar of yet another jointly 
owned property Parks will undoubtedly hire yet another law firm 
to try to defend himself. It's inconceivable that Sims will risk 
further sanctions by taking on this future case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
IMPROPERLY REPRESENTING FORMER PARTNER 
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A) For some years, beginning in the early 1970's, 
Plaintiff/Appellant Gregory H. Oar and Defendant/Respondent Dale 
S. Parks were partners in a commercial printing business known as 
Sterling Press Inc. Together we purchased a building at 2630 
South 300 East, South Salt Lake City, Utah. In the early 1980?s 
they decided to divide the assets of the business and go their 
separate ways. One major asset which they agreed to keep was 
this building in which Oar retained a 42.87% interest and Parks 
retained the remaining 57.13%. Over time Oar had some financial 
needs to keep his new venture afloat. He borrowed $20,000 for 90 
days from Barry Birkenshaw for which he gave a quit claim deed on 
the property as collateral. Before the note came due Plaintiff's 
business venture failed and he was unable to repay the loan. Mr. 
Birkenshaw recorded the quit claim deed and Plaintiff lost his 
interest in the property. Subsequently, Birkenshaw contacted 
Plaintiff's mother, Florence Bowers, and transferred his interest 
in the property back to Mrs. Bowers, at a discount, with the in-
tention that Mrs. Bowers would eventually transfer the interest 
back to her son, Gregory Oar. 
B) Later, Oar wished to withdraw some funds from the 
building in order to engage in other activities. Through his 
mother, Oar offered his portion of the building for sale subject 
to his partner's lease agreement, however, when he found a buyer, 
Parks frustrated the sale by forbidding the prospective buyer 
from even entering the building to inspect it. 
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C) On August 2, 1990, Florence Bowers, filed suit in 
Third District Court to increase the rent paid on her portion of 
the commercial building which was jointly owned by Defendant-
Respondent Dale S. Parks, or alternately to partition the 
building either by sale or a physical partition. During 1992, 
Florence Bowers became ill and finding business decisions very 
difficult along with the extreme anxiety over the lawsuit she 
transferred the lawsuit over the building to her son Plain-
tiff/Appellant Gregory H. Oar. See stipulation (appendix #2). 
D) On or about the 5th of June 1992, Plaintiff 
/Appellant Oar filed a motion to disqualify Defendant's attorney 
Allen Sims based on the premise that since Allen Sims had been 
Oar's attorney when he was president of Sterling Press he was no 
longer eligible to represent another party against Oar. 
E) Oar moved the court to disqualify Sims as 
defendant's attorney. A hearing was held. The court ruled 
against Plaintiff Oar. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
PERJURY 
A) On May 12, 1992 the court heard Plaintiff's motion 
seeking release of funds held in the Sterling Press building 
rental account. 
B) The motion specifically requested a full account-
ing of the rental income and a release of the funds in order to 
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forestall foreclosure scheduled for the following morning. Allen 
Sims knowingly lied to Judge Sawaya when he stated that there was 
no accounting and there were no funds to disburse. Proof of this 
became available to Plaintiff on December 10, 1992 when someone 
at Sterling Press made a rental payment to the new owner of the 
property and included an accounting which included several previ-
ous years. Allen Sims was fully aware of this special checking 
account since he himself had received funds from the account with 
Gregory Oar's forged signature. 
C) As a result of Allen Sims lying to Judge Sawaya that no 
funds were available in the property account, when in fact there 
were sufficient funds to redeem the property, and the fact that 
plaintiff had insufficient funds to redeem the property, plain-
tiff lost the property at the foreclosure sale on May 13, 1992. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Attorney Allen Sims was hired and did extensive legal work 
for the Plaintiff Gregory H. Oar. Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct clearly states that this prohibits Sims from 
representing Dale S. Parks in any matter involving Gregory Oar. 
Therefore, Allen Sims should have been dismissed as the 
Defendants' attorney back in July of 1992. 
In addition, at a hearing on May 11, 1992, Allen Sims lied 
to Judge Sawaya that he had no knowledge that an accounting was 
being kept and that there were no funds deposited in a joint 
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property rental account, when in fact he himself had been issued 
a check from the account with Gregory Oar's forged signature. 
ARGUMENT 
Because Judge Sawaya's ruling was contrary to the great 
weight of evidence, the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's 
motion to disqualify counsel for conflict of interest. 
A. AN ATTORNEY/CLIENT RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN OAR AND SIMS 
Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
presupposes the existence of a prior attorney/client relationship 
between the challenged attorney and the party who is disputing 
the attorney's representation of the adversarial party in the 
current litigation. Thus, the first question to be answered in a 
motion to disqualify is whether there was a prior attorney/client 
relationship. Otaka v. Klien 791 P2d 713, 717 (Hawaii 1990) . 
Sims initially performed services for Oar in 1981 when 
Sterling Press was liquidated. At that time, Sims negotiated the 
terms of the liquidation agreement, and drafted the documents 
necessary to effectuate the liquidation. Where a small, closely 
held corporation is involved, and in the absence of a clear 
understanding with the corporate owners that the attorney 
represents solely the corporation and not their individual 
interest, it is improper for the attorney thereafter to represent 
a third party whose interest are adverse to those of the 
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stockholders and which arise out of a transaction which the 
attorney handled for the corporation. In Re Brownstin, 602 P.2d 
655, 657 (Or. App.1979). In actuality, the attorney in such a 
situation represents the corporate owners in their individual 
capacities as well as the corporation unless other arrangements 
are clearly made. Id. In the matter at hand, Sterling Press had 
only two shareholders. When Sims negotiated and drafted the 
liquidation agreement, he was representing not only the 
corporation, but also Oar and Parks in their individual 
capacities. 
Sims was also representing Oar when he negotiated and 
drafted the lease for the property, and when he negotiated and 
drafted the 1985 agreement. In Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344 
(Wyo. 1988), the Supreme Court of Wyoming interpreted Rule 1.9 of 
the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct. That Rule is 
identical to Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
In that case, the court held that when an attorney does nothing 
to indicate or dispel a party's belief that the attorney is 
representing his interest, then an attorney/client relationship 
exists between the attorney and that party. Id. at 347. When 
Sims drafted the lease and the 1985 agreement, Oar was under the 
impression that Sims was representing his interests. Sims did 
nothing to dispel Oar's belief that he was representing him in 
the negotiation and drafting of these documents. As such, an 
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attorney/client relationship existed between Sims and Oar with 
regard to those agreements as well. 
The fact that Oar may not have paid Sims for all of the work 
which he performed would not control the question of whether an 
attorney/client relationship existed between Sims and Oar with 
regard to those agreements as well* 
The fact that Oar may not have paid Sims for all of the work 
which he performed should not control the question of whether an 
attorney/client relationship does not require the payment of a 
fee or formal retainer but may be implied from the conduct of the 
parties. Matter of McGlothlen, 663 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Wash. 1983). 
Payment may be an important consideration, but it is not 
essential to the existence of an attorney/client relationship, 
especially for purposes of apply Rule 1.9. Carlson v. Langdon, 
supra. 
Because Oar was one of only two stockholders in Sterling 
Press, and because Sims represented Sterling Press, Sims also 
represented Oar with regard to the liquidation agreement. In 
addition, an attorney/client relationship also existed between 
Sims and Oar with regard to the lease and the 1985 agreement 
because Sims did nothing to dispel Oar's notion that he was 
representing his interest in those matters. An attorney/client 
relationship is thus presumed to have existed between Sims and 
Oar. 
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B. THE MATTERS INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION ARE SUBSTANTIALLY 
FACTUALLY RELATED TO THE MATTERS IN WHICH SIMS REPRESENTED OAR 
Once it has been established that an attorney/client 
relationship existed between the challenged lawyer and the party 
who is disputing the attorney's representation of an adversarial 
party in the current litigation, the court must determine whether 
the matters are substantially factually related. The court must 
determine whether in the factual context the matters involving 
the two clients are related in some substantial way. Carlson v. 
Langdon, supra. If the two matters have common facts, the 
attorney in a position to receive confidential information which 
possibly could be used to the detriment of the former client in a 
later proceeding. Id. 
In the matter at hand, Sims' prior representation of Oar is 
substantially factually related to the matters being litigated in 
this action. In proving the allegations made in his Complaint, 
Oar must refer to the circumstances surrounding the negotiation 
and signing of the liquidation agreement, the lease, and the 1985 
agreement. Sims represented Oar with regard to the drafting and 
the signing of all of those documents. In his representation, 
Sims became privy to confidential information which he could use 
to Oar's detriment in this matter. In fact, Sims has already 
used provisions of the 1985 agreement to support his argument 
opposing Oar's Motion for Release of funds. 
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Oar's recovery in this matter is predicated upon proving the 
facts related to the liquidation agreement, the lease, and the 
1985 agreement. Sims representations are substantially factually 
related, and Rule 1.9 prohibits Sims from representing parties 
with adverse interest to Oar in this matter. 
Regarding Plaintiff's Charge of Perjury against Allen Sims 
the record speaks for itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the Code of Professional Ethics Rule 1.9 it is clear 
that Allen Sims should have been disqualified as counsel for Dale 
S. Parks and Sterling Press Inc. 
In addition, Allen Sims knowingly lied to Judge Sawaya when 
he stated that there was no accounting and there were no funds in 
the property rental account. The funds that existed could have 
prevented Appellant from losing his interest in the property in 
foreclosure. 
Therefore, Appellant Gregory H. Oar prays the court; 
1) Order that the matter be remanded to the Third District 
Court for retrial but barring Allen Sims from representing Dale 
S. Parks and Sterling Press Inc. 
2) Or alternately, that Defendant Dale S. Parks be ordered 
to pay Appellant Gregory H. Oar the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($50,000) for his loses as a result of Attorney Allen Sims 
actions. 
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3) Plus any other relief that the court deems appropriate, 
DATED this 23rd day of November 1993. 
Gregory H. Oar 
Appellant acting Pro Se 
APPENDIX 
1. Attached herewith is a copy of Rule 1.9, Conflict of Interest: 
Former Client, from Utah Court Rules Annotated, Rules of 
Professional Conduct, pp. 972-3. 
2. Stipulation substituting Oar for Bowers as plaintiff. 
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K u l e 1.9 CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ent, he is peculiarly susceptible to the charge 
that he unduly influenced or overreached the 
client If a client voluntarily offers to make a 
gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept the 
gift, but before doing so, he should urge that 
the client secure disinterested advice from an 
independent, competent person who is cogni-
zant of all the circumstances. Other than in 
exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should in-
sist that an instrument in which his client de-
sires to name him beneficially be prepared by 
another lawyer selected by the client/' 
Paragraph (d) is substantially similar to DR 
5-104(B), but refers to "literary or media" 
rights, a more generally inclusive term than 
"publication" rights. 
After termination of a client-lawyer relation-
ship, a lawyer may not represent another cli-
ent except in conformity with this Rule. The 
principles in Rule 1.7 determine whether the 
interests of the present and former client are 
adverse Thus, a lawyer could not properly 
seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a con-
tract drafted on behalf of the former client. So 
also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused 
person could not properly represent the ac-
cused in a subsequent civil action against the 
government concerning the same transaction. 
The scope of a "matter" for purposes of Rule 
1.9(a) may depend on the facts of a particular 
situation or transaction. The lawyer's involve-
ment in a matter can also be a question of de-
gree. When a lawyer has been directly involved 
in a specific transaction, subsequent represen-
tation of other clients with materially adverse 
interests clearly is prohibited. On the other 
hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type 
of problem for a former client is not precluded 
from later representing another client in a 
wholly distinct problem of that type even 
though the subsequent representation involves 
a position adverse to the prior client. Similar 
considerations can apply to the reassignment 
ADMINISTRATION 972 
Paragraph (e)(1) is similar to DR 5103(B), 
but eliminates the requirement that "the client 
remains ultimately liable for such expenses." 
Paragraph (e)(2) has no counterpart in the 
Code. 
Paragraph (f) is substantially identical to 
DR 5-107(A)(l). 
Paragraph (g) is substantially identical to 
DR 5-106. 
The first clause of paragraph <h) is similar to 
DR 6-102(A). There was no counterpart in the 
Code to the second clause of paragraph (h). 
Paragraph (i) has no counterpart in the 
Code. 
Paragraph (j) is substantially identical to DR 
5-103(A). 
of military lawyers between defense and prose-
cution functions within the same military ju-
risdiction. The underlying question is whether 
the lawyer was so involved in the matter that 
the subsequent representation can be justly re-
garded as a changing of sides in the matter in 
question. 
Information acquired by the lawyer in the 
course of representing a client may not subse-
quently be used by the lawyer to the disadvan-
tage of the client. However, the fact that a law-
yer has once served a client does not preclude 
the lawyer from using generally known infor-
mation about the client when later represent-
ing another client. 
Disqualification from subsequent represen-
tation is for the protection of clients and can be 
waived by them. A waiver is effective only if 
there is disclosure of the circumstances, includ-
ing the lawyer's intended role in behalf of the 
new client. 
With regard to an opposing party's raising a 
question of conflict of interest, see Comment to 
Rule 1.7. With regard to disqualification of a 
firm with which a lawyer is associated, see 
Rule 1.10. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Attorney's assertion of retaining What items of client's property or funds are 
lien as violation of ethical code or rules govern- not subject to attorney's retaining lien, 70 
ing professional conduct, 69 A.L.R.4th 974. A.L.R.4th 827. 
Rule 1.9. Conflict of Interest: Former Client. 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not there-
after: 
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially factually 
related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to 
the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after 
consultation; or 
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage 
of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a 
client or when the information has become generally known. 
COMMENT 
Appendix Page 1 
173 R U i E S OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R u l e 1 10 
CODE COMPARISON 
There was no counteipait to paiagraphs (a) 
fcnd (b) in the Disciplmaiy Rules of the Code 
[The piubleni addiessed in paragraph (a) was 
sometimes dealt with undei the lubric of 
fcanon 9 ol tht Code which provided 4. law 
wer should avoid es tn the appeal ance of impro 
Iriety EC 4 6 stated that the obligation of a 
lawyu to preserve the confidences and secrets 
tfhis client continues aftei the teimination of 
Ins emplo)inent 
I The pioMsion in paiagiaph (a) foi waiver by 
Rhe foimci client is similar to DR 5 105iC) 
Definition ot Firm 
For pui poses of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct the term firm includes lawyers in a 
private firm and lawyers employed in the legal 
department of a corporation or other organiza 
tion oi in a legal services organization 
Whether two oi more lawyers constitute a firm 
within this definition can depend on the spe 
cific facts bor example two practitioners who 
share ofilce space and occasionally consult or 
assist each other ordinarily would not be re 
garded as constituting a fum However, if they 
present themselves to the public in a way sug 
gesting that they are a firm or conduct them 
selves as a firm they should be regarded as a 
firm for purposes of the Rules The terms of 
any formal agreement between associated law 
yers are relevant in determining whether they 
are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual 
access to confidential information concerning 
the clients they serve furthermore, it is rele 
vant in doubtful cases to consider the underly 
mg purpose of the rule that is involved A 
group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm 
for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer 
should not represent opposing parties in litiga 
tion while it might not be so regarded for pur 
Ihe exception in the last sentence of paia 
graph (b) peimits a lawyei to use infoimation 
ielating to a former client that is in the public 
domain a use that was not prohibited by the 
Code which protected only confidences and 
secrets Since the scope of paiagiaph (a) is 
much broader than confidences and seciets 
it is necessary under the Rules to define when 
a lawyer ma> make use of infoimation about a 
client aftei the client lawyei relationship has 
terminated 
poses of the rule that infoimation acquued b> 
one lawyer is attributed to another 
With respect to the law depaitment of an 
organization there is ordinal ily no question 
that the members of the department constitute 
a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Pro 
fessional Conduct However there can be un 
certainty as to the identity of the client ror 
example it may not be clear whether the law 
department of a corporation represents a sub 
sidiary or an affiliated coiporation as well as 
the corpoiation by wtueh the members, ot the 
department are directly employed A similar 
question can arise concerning an unincoipo 
rated association and its local affiliates 
Similar questions can also arise with respect 
to lawyers in legal aid Lawyers employed in 
the same unit of a legal service organization 
constitute a firm but not necessai ily those em 
ployed tn separate units As in in** case of inde 
pendent practitioners, whether the lawyers 
should be treated as associated with each other 
can depend on the particular rule that is in 
volved and on the specific facts of the situation 
Where the lawyer has joined a pnvate firm 
after having represented the government the 
situation is governed by Rule 1 11(a) and (b), 
where a lawyer represents the government af 
ter having served private clients the situation 
Rule 1.10. Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. 
(a) While lawyei b aie abbociated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly 
repie&ent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be piohibited 
fiom doing bo by Rule 1 7, 1 8(c) 1 9 or 2 2 
(b) When a lawyei becomes associated with a fum, the fnm may not know 
mgly lepiesent a peison in the same or a substantially factually ielated mat 
tei in which that lawyei, or a fum with which the lawyer has associated, had 
previously tepiesented a client whose interests aie materially adverse to that 
peison and about whom the lawyer had acquired information piotected by 
Rules 1 6 and 1 9(b) that is mateiial to the mattei 
(c) When a lawyei hab teiminated an association with a firm, the fum is 
not pi ohibited fi om thei eafter representing a pei son with mtei ests matei lally 
adverse to those of a client repiesented by the formerly associated lawyer 
unless 
(1) The mattei is the same or substantially related to that in which the 
foimetly associated lawyei lepiesented the client, and 
(2) Any lawyei remaining in the firm has information piotected by 
Rules 1 6 and 1 9(b) that is material to the mattei 
(d) A disqualification prescubed by this Rule may be waived by the affected 
client under the conditions stated in Rule 1 7 
COMMENT 
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MICHAEL L. CHIDESTER #5263 
MOONEY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-5635 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
FLORENCE BOWERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE S. PARKS, STERLING PRESS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, WEST 
ONE BANK, a Utah corporation, 
RICHARD G. NEWTON, and BRUCE 
M. GIFFEN, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. 900904365 PR 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
—oooOooo— 
Defendants, Dale S. Parks and Sterling Press, Inc., by and through their attorney of 
record, Allen Sims, hereby stipulate and agree that the Court may substitute Gregory Oar as 
plaintiff for Florence Bowers in the above-entitled matter. 
DATED this /f- day ofifcseh, 1992. 
ALLEN SIMS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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